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In the past two decades, Americans have witnessed the rapid convergence
of telecommunications and data processing and have embraced the remark-
able by-products of that convergence. Those by-products have generated
dramatic new capabilities in such diverse endeavors as space travel, high
speed rail transportation, emergency health care, legal research, criminal jus-
tice, large scale inventory control, and banking. However, these new capa-
bilities are not free from the perplexing problems which frequently accom-
pany profound technological change. Such change can suddenly bankrupt
the rationale behind either a particular industry's existence or a participant's
involvement in that industry. Furthermore, while such new capabilities often
address problems peculiar to the old technology, by their very nature they
can create new and unforeseen problems.
On January 12, 1976, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem issued notice of a proposed rulemaking change to Regulation J.1 While
this may appear to be simply a minor administrative adjustment to the Fed-
eral Reserve's rules and regulations, it signals one of the more prominent de-
velopments in the establishment of a national electronic funds transfer sys-
tem. By presenting this proposal to an open forum, the Federal Reserve
Board has given the public not only a glimpse of the policy problems which
the Board must resolve but, more importantly, has granted the public an op-
portunity to openly reflect on the Board's involvement in electronic funds
transfer systems (EFTS). This article will address the problems inherent in
such involvement. The issues discussed here, however, should not be con-
strued as ones which are limited to the activity of the Federal Reserve; indeed,
* Acting Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, 1974-1976. B.A.,
1962, Virginia Military Institute; J.D., 1970, John Marshall Law School.
1. 41 Fed. Reg. 3097 (1976). See text accompanying notes 17-23, 28-32 infra for
discussion of Regulation J and the proposed amendments.
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they apply to all governmental involvement in any EFT system.
I. THE CLEARING HOUSE
During the 1960's, the number of checks written on demand deposit ac-
counts increased to the point at which, in 1970, the total number of checks
that the payments transfer system was required to process was about 22.5
billion.2 In seeking to cure many of the problems generated by such a large
volume of paperwork being transported through the funds transfer system,
the Federal Reserve turned to automated data processing. As a result, the
automated clearing house came into practical use during the early 1970's.8
However, its use was limited to the physical delivery of electronic payment
information by means of magnetic tape. The obvious capability of the tele-
communications system to transport this electronic information has not yet
been used by the automated clearing houses.
Despite this technological paradox, it is obvious that the next step will
be to link the automated clearing houses via telecommunications. This
interconnection, however, is not a simple matter. Aside from the tech-
nical problems that might arise, two major policy questions are generated.
At the outset, it should be observed that the technology which the Federal
Reserve is attempting to embrace, namely, the convergence of telecommuni-
cations with data processing, has bankrupted the rationale upon which the
Board has established itself as the operator of the national payments transfer
system. To the extent that payments are transferred electronically, it is no
longer necessary for an arm of the federal government to provide clearing
services. As paper disappears from the system, so does the rationale for Fed-
eral Reserve involvement. Furthermore, if the 'Board engages in operating
an electronic funds transfer mechanism on a national scale, then new prob-
lems are certain to materialize, particularly within the realm of privacy.
Therefore, because of the debilitating influence of the new technology upon
the Board's present reason for operating the national payments clearing mech-
anism, and because of the new problems that are certain to be generated by
the Board's involvement, the Board should eschew direct involvement as an
operator of EFT services. Rather, it should embark upon a deliberate with-
drawal from its existing level of EFT involvement and confine its role to regu-
lating and monitoring the EFT system.
2. ARTHUR D. LrITLE, INC., THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRONIc FUNDS TRANSFER
50 (1970).
3. Id. at 98-101.
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A. Development of the Clearing House Concept
Formalized clearing house activity in the United States had its origin in
the establishment of the New York Clearing House Association on October
4, 1853. 4 The number of private clearing houses in this country grew to over
300 by the mid-1920's.5 However, with the advance of the industrial revolu-
tion, the consequent growth of the nation's economy, and the increase in the
nation's population and mobility, private clearing houses became less and less
capable of efficiently managing the payments system on a national scale. Un-
der that paper-based system, the complexity of clearing millions upon millions
of checks became unworkable at the national and regional clearing points.6
With the passage of the Federal Reserve Act-in 1913,7 the federal govern-
ment created an agency, the Federal Reserve Board, that would be directly
involved in operating these overburdened clearing points. Congress, in the
Act, gave the Board permission to engage in clearing house activities; how-
ever, in granting that authority, Congress was extremely careful to withhold
a mandate for the Federal Reserve to create a universal clearing system. In-
deed, in 1923 the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond was severely admon-
ished by the Supreme Court for having been so bold as to suggest that it pos-
sessed such a mandate.s
This discretionary clearing function was included in the Act not so much
because the Federal Reserve System was expected to function as a central
banking authority, but more as a result of concerns about ineffective trans-
portation and the inability to clear items from rural and western banks.9 The
problems of transportation and distance were so perplexing in the clearing
process that even the Federal Reserve did not believe itself capable of provid-
ing clearing services for all potential affiliated institutions. 10 The complexity
4. Andrews, The Operation of the City Clearing House, 51 YALE L.J. 582, 587
(1942).
5. Id.
6. Hock, EFTS or EVE, in THE ECONOMICS OF A NATIONAL ELECTRONIC FuNDS
TRANSFER SYSTEM 65, 71 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 13,
1974).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1970) (originally enacted as the Federal Reserve Act of
1913, ch. 6, §§ 11, 16, 38 Stat. 261, 262, 265). For a history of the Act, see LAUGH-
LIN, THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT, ITS ORIGINS AND PROBLEMS 3-208 (1933). See also
Hearings on H.R. 7837 Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 63d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1913).
8. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 664 (1923).
See also Community Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 500 F.2d 282, 289-90 (9th Cir.
1974).
9. A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 199-240 (1956).
10. Cf. Fergus County v. Federal Reserve Bank, 75 Mont. 582, 244 P. 883 (1926).
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in handling the payments clearing system has been suggested as a third reason
for the Federal Reserve's involvement."' This complexity was exacerbated
by the increasingly diverse locations of the population, which created an at-
mosphere conducive to direct government involvement in an otherwise pri-
vate sector activity.
B. Technology's Impact on the Clearing House
The rationale for direct Federal Reserve operation of the national clearing
houses is historically based upon problems arising from distance, transporta-
tion and the complexity of processing the paper-based information. The ca-
pabilities of today's telecommunications technology, however, have effectively
eliminated these problems. Simply put, the present state of the art in tele-
communications has eliminated the need for the Federal Reserve to operate
an electronic payment system.
In an electronic system, the three fundamental reasons for Federal Reserve
operation of the paper-based clearing system evaporate. As for the distance
factor, technology can bring the entire information universe within immediate
reach.' 2  Once credit or debit information is reduced to electronic impulses
and placed upon a telecommunications system, distance between an origina-
tor and a recipient becomes largely irrelevant. With the elimination of dis-
tance as a constraint, the transportation motive behind a direct Federal Re-
serve operation of the clearing houses disappears. In an electronic system,
information that was once transported physically around the country is now
capable of traveling at the speed of light, somewhere in excess of 180,000
miles per second.
The third motive for Federal Reserve involvement, system complexity, be-
comes similarly noncritical in an EFT environment. In the paper-based sys-
tem, the problem was not only the complexity of transferring information but
also the maintenance of effective control over the large volume of paper upon
which the information rested. Accordingly, as one neared the central clear-
ing houses, the complexity of the clearing process increased dramatically. In
an electronic system, however, the movement of physical objects within the
system becomes nonexistent. Additionally, the most complex stage in the
process shifts from the core of the system to its periphery.' 8  The periphery
of any electronic data system is responsible for the entry of the data on one
side and its storage on the other. The core becomes an inanimate computer-
11. See Hock, supra note 6, at 7 1.
12. See Morton & Ernst, The Social Impacts of Electronic Funds Transfer, 13 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS 1148 (1975).
13. See Hock, supra note 6, at 71-72.
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ized switch that could be owned by any one of several entrepreneurs and
operated as efficiently and securely as the Federal Reserve operates today's
paper-oriented clearing houses. Indeed, a number of clever entrepreneurs
in the financial and bank card industries have already established themselves
in this market. 14 Accordingly, if the Federal Reserve sought to operate the
most complex stage in the new system, it would find itself moving inexorably
toward the periphery of the system, an area in which the private sector has
already demonstrated its eagerness to participate.' 5 Furthermore, in addition
to those private companies now involved in this market, new entrants in the
telecommunications and data processing industries are providing specialized
switching services that are easily adaptable to an electronic payments system,
and several have sought and received authority from the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to provide services quite similar to those which the Fed-
eral Reserve appears to be contemplating.' 6 In sum, the elimination of these
historical constraints upon the payments transfer system reduces the scope
of the clearing task from the unmanageable dilemma of the 1920's to a situa-
tion that is now quite manageable by the private sector. Consequently, the
complexion of our payments system is undergoing dramatic and far-reaching
technological changes, and those changes are creating an environment which
may well be inhospitable to direct Federal Reserve operation.
II. REGULATION J
A. Current Provisions
Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act requires that the Board promulgate
regulations governing the warranties, liabilities and other obligations in-
volved in the provision of clearing house services to Federal Reserve Banks.'7
Those regulations are embodied in Regulation J,18 which is subject to paro-
chial adjustment by the Federal Reserve Banks as they issue their operating
letters governing the details of their clearing house operations. 9 Regulation
J applies uniquely to the clearing houses operated by the Federal Reserve,
14. Id. at 72-74.
15. See, e.g., id. at 72-73.
16. See Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation of Functions and the
Role of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED. COM. B.J. 161, 1,62-68
(1974). See also Telenet Communications Corp., 46 F.C.C.2d 680 (1974); Graphnet
Systems, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 800 (1974); Packet Communications, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922
(1973).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1970).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1975).
19. Id. § 210.16 (1975).
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and to the extent that the clearing process is associated with a private clearing
house, Regulation J does not seem to apply.
As presently written, Regulation J views clearing house activity as a pecu-
liarly paper-oriented phenomenon. 20  In 1967, it was amended to embrace
more precisely the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) definition of an
"item" as "any instrument [used] for the payment of money .... ,,21 While
Regulation J itself does not define the term "instrument," explicit language
in a comment to article 4 of the UCC seems to limit its applicability strictly
to paper. 22 This limitation is confirmed by language in the recently promul-
gated notice of proposed rulemaking which states that nonpaper (i.e., elec-
tronic) transfers are now governed by operating letters and not by the terms
of Regulation J.23
Despite this limitation of Regulation J's impact to paper-oriented clearing
houses, the Federal Reserve's development of electronic funds transfer capa-
bilities does not seem to have been impeded. On June 17, 1971, the Board
of Governors issued a policy statement that sought "basic changes in the Na-
tion's system for handling money payments .. . [as] essentially transitional
steps toward replacing the use of checks with electronic transfer of funds."
'24
Later, in December 1972, a Federal Reserve Bulletin stated that: "It is an-
ticipated that the Federal Reserve will install and manage a nationwide com-
munications network through which interregional settlements between finan-
cial institutions will be made."'25 Finally, in October 1974, George W. Mit-
chell, then Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, told an audience in ,Boston that:
[A]ll Reserve Banks have installed integrated communications
equipment. This wire network-in addition to the surface and air
courier systems for the movement of paper-now provides the Fed-
eral Reserve with the capability to deliver payments by check,
magnetic tape, hard copy, and wire form to any bank in the nation,
and for that matter to any other depository institution via a com-
mercial bank.2 0
20. Id. § 210.2(a) (1975).
21. 32 Fed. Reg. 10912 (1967).
22. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104, Comment 4. "The word 'item'
is 'banking language' and includes non-negotiable as well as negotiable paper calling for
money and also similar paper governed by [articles 3 and 8] .
23. 41 Fed. Reg. 3097, 3098 (1976).
24. 57 FED. RES. BULL. 546 (1971).
25. 58 FED. RES. BULL. 1010 (1972).
26. Mitchell, Agendas for Action on the Payments Mechanism, in THE ECONOMICS OF
A NATIONAL ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM 9, 10-11 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Conference Series No. 13, 1974).
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An indication of the extent of the Federal Reserve's involvement in the de-
ployment of electronic funds transfer facilities is the fact that there are now
21 operational automated clearing houses, 19 of which are operated by the
Federal Reserve. 27
B. Proposed Changes to Regulation J
The regulations contained in the Federal Reserve's notice of proposed rule-
making have several sections that collectively provide the Federal Reserve
with the legal framework within which it could operate its EFT facilities on-
line-that is, fully coupled via telecommunications. 28  As mentioned earlier,
Regulation J currently limits the form in which funds may be transferred to
traditional "items and instruments"-that is, the normal paper instruments
that one associates with traditional checks, notes or drafts. 29 Section 210.52
of the proposed regulations redefines these financial instruments and items.
Of critical importance is subsection (c), which defines "instrument for the
payment of money" as "any writing contained in or on any medium approved
by section 210.53 for the issuance, transmission, or recording of credit items,
addressed by one person to another and evidencing a right to the payment
of money." °30  Subsection 210.53(c) defines "items" as "any form of com-
munication, other than voice, that is registered upon, or is in [a] form suit-
able for being registered upon magnetic tape, disc, or any other medium de-
signed to capture and contain in durable form conventional signals used for
the electronic communication of messages."''1 This definition is incorporated
by reference into section 210.72 and thereby applies to debit items as well.32
A major purpose of section 210.53 is to define an "item" not just in terms
of a physical medium, but also in terms of ephemeral electronic impulses
which can be registered on a medium. These impulses are precisely the traf-
fic carried by all telecommunications systems, and the instantaneous ex-
change of these impulses on a telecommunications network is the essence of
EFT. Accordingly, the proposed changes cannot be viewed as an expeditious
resolution of some mechanical problems that have arisen in today's paper-
based clearing houses. Rather, these amendments to Regulation J would
permit almost any activity that could be carried on in a full EFT environment
to be conducted by the Federal Reserve. In particular, the scope and direc-
27. NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HousE AsSOCIATION, NACHA QuARTERLY Up-
DATE 6 (Apr. 1976).
28. These proposed sections are 210.52, .53, .72, and .75; see 41 Fed. Reg. 3099-3100,
3102-04 (1976).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 210.2 (1975).
30. 41, Fed. Reg. 3100 (1976).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 3102.
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tion of the amendment to Regulation J in conjunction with the continued op-
eration of the present Federal Reserve Communications System would cast
the Federal Reserve in the role of providing the services necessary to sustain
its EFT system on-line. In other words, the Federal Reserve would be the
vendor of the core of the nation's EFT services. The Board's historic role
in the clearing mechanism of this nation would, under the pressures of dra-
matic technological change, push it ultimately into the role of operator and
manager of the essential telecommunications services supporting an EFT sys-
tem.
III. INHERENT DANGERS OF FEDERAL RESERVE CONTROL
Electronic funds transfer is the product of an interconnection of computers
with telecommunications and, on its simplest level, creates the capacity to di-
rectly interconnect the records which indicate the availability and transfera-
bility of funds in an individual's accounts. Those accounts may be in the
names of banks, as in the current Federal Reserve System, in the names of
a variety of nonbanking institutions, or in the names of individual citizens.
In any EFT system the transfer of funds will result in the exchange of exten-
sive account information between a wide variety of accounts.
The dangers of federal control are partially the result of the incredibly
rapid innovation and technological change that have been a part of both the
computer and telecommunications industries in recent years. Few experts
will argue the fact that a new generation of computer hardware or software
techniques will occur about every five years. With such rapid innovation and
the concomitant competition that has accompanied it, tremendous benefits
have already accrued to the government and to society at large. To sanction
governmental control of certain technologically provided services would only
result in stifling the innovation that has already occurred in this field. In-
deed, the mere threat of federal intervention could chill the development and
provision of private sector services. It is axiomatic that entrepreneurs in our
free enterprise system will not commit nonrecoverable capital to programs
that are likely to be rendered useless by action of the Federal Reserve Board.
For an entrepreneur to do so, particularly after having been forewarned,
would indicate callous disregard for the welfare of the enterprise, resulting
in personal liability at best, and corporate fatality at worst. Accordingly, the
threat of development or expansion of an operational role for the Federal
Reserve could well discourage competition, innovation 'and efficiency in 'the
provision of EFT services.
In addition, there is a danger that governmental operation of such a system
may ultimately pose very real threats to the privacy of individual citizens.
[Vol. 25:739
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Any EFT system has the potential to be a highly effective tool for policing
the behavior of American citizens. A detailed monitoring of the information
carried on such a system could easily generate data on a user's buying habits,
political activities, physical movements, and nearly every other aspect of his
personal life. To acknowledge such a potential, however, is not to suggest
that it is inevitable. EFT, like other systems of automated personal docu-
mentation, is a complex technical instrumentality which obeys no purposes
other than those which are assigned to it. Since our society is one in which
the guarantees of personal liberty are of paramount value, I believe that the
dangers of unfettered government access to the "electronic footprints" of
American citizens must be carefully evaluated before we can consider com-
mitting ourselves to government operation or control of EFT services.
Fear of the dangers to individual privacy resulting from government opera-
tion and control of EFT services has evoked extensive criticism of proposed
EFT systems. Recent testimony by Donald Alexander, Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler
before the Privacy Protection Study Commission is ample evidence of the im-
mediacy of these dangers.38 As Commissioner Alexander testified, while the
IRS was created as an independent agency, and while its records were in-
tended to be used only for income tax purposes, it has become a repository
in which other agencies of the federal government seek information for crimi-
nal prosecution, as has been done by the Justice Department in cases of po-
litical harassment.8 4 Deputy Attorney General Tyler indicated that he be-
lieves such access to the records of other government agencies is necessary
for the effective functioning of the Justice Department and other law enforce-
ment systems.85
In the past, the Federal Reserve has had little information which would
excite the interest of the Department of Justice or other law enforcement
agencies. However, with the advent of EFT, the Federal Reserve could pro-
vide access to a great deal of information flowing through an EFT system.
The convergence of high speed microwave telecommunications technology
with the developments in computer technology creates information flow capa-
bilities of colossal magnitude. Pressure by other government entities to gain
33. See Hearings on Federal Tax Return Confidentiality Before the Privacy Protec-
tion Study Comm'n, Mar. 11, 1976, at 9-104. (Available at Privacy Protection Study
Commission, Washington, D.C.).
34. See id. at 25-33.
35. Id. at 56-60. Tyler cited the lack of recorded incidents of abuse of access and
the Justice Department's need to fulfill its statutory duties as reasons for allowing con-
tinued access,
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access to this new source of information would be inevitable if the Federal
Reserve Board were functioning as the operator of the EFT services, and
there is little reason to believe that the Board would be any more successful
in resisting such pressure than the IRS has been in the past. For these rea-
sons, the questions of privacy and confidentiality are more than mere hypo-
theticals.
IV. CONCLUSION
In reviewing the early developments in EFT, it is important to remember
that we are not merely applying first aid to our paper-based funds transfer
system. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that we are fashion-
ing tomorrow's payments mechanism out of the computer-telecommunications
system. As such, it is incumbent upon today's decisionmakers to insure that
the errors of the past not be repeated. 'Furthermore, to the extent that tech-
nology reshapes the underlying premises of our payment system, EFT policy
should reflect those changes. Thus, it is the long range effects that we must
focus upon in our review of Regulation J, and not the short term relief that
a change to Regulation J might offer for a handful of problems that have
arisen in the existing payments system. Once one comprehends the probable
development of the full EFT system, the significance of the proposed
amendments to Regulation J becomes obvious, and the compelling reasons
against the Federal Reserve's operational control of the system become
dramatically exposed.
[Vol. 25: 739
